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Review Article
What is ‘moral distress’?
A narrative synthesis
of the literature
Georgina Morley and Jonathan Ives
University of Bristol, UK
Caroline Bradbury-Jones and Fiona Irvine
University of Birmingham, UK
Abstract
Aims: The aim of this narrative synthesis was to explore the necessary and sufficient conditions required to
define moral distress.
Background: Moral distress is said to occur when one has made a moral judgement but is unable to act
upon it. However, problems with this narrow conception have led to multiple redefinitions in the empirical
and conceptual literature. As a consequence, much of the research exploring moral distress has lacked
conceptual clarity, complicating attempts to study the phenomenon.
Design: Systematic literature review and narrative synthesis (November 2015–March 2016).
Data sources: Ovid MEDLINE® In-Process & Other Non-Indexed Citations 1946–Present, PsycINFO®
1967–Present, CINAHL® Plus 1937–Present, EMBASE 1974–24 February 2016, British Nursing Index
1994–Present, Social Care Online, Social Policy and Practice Database (1890–Present), ERIC (EBSCO)
1966–Present and Education Abstracts.
Review methods: Literature relating to moral distress was systematically retrieved and subjected to
relevance assessment. Narrative synthesis was the overarching framework that guided quality assessment,
data analysis and synthesis.
Results: In all, 152 papers underwent initial data extraction and 34 were chosen for inclusion in the
narrative synthesis based on both quality and relevance. Analysis revealed different proposed conditions
for the occurrence of moral distress: moral judgement, psychological and physical effects, moral dilemmas,
moral uncertainty, external and internal constraints and threats to moral integrity.
Conclusion: We suggest the combination of (1) the experience of a moral event, (2) the experience of
‘psychological distress’ and (3) a direct causal relation between (1) and (2) together are necessary and
sufficient conditions for moral distress.
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Introduction
The concept of moral distress (MD) was introduced to nursing by Jameton1 who defined MD as arising,
‘when one knows the right thing to do, but institutional constraints make it nearly impossible to pursue the
right course of action’. MD has subsequently gained increasing attention in nursing research, the majority of
which conducted in North America but now emerging in South America, Europe, the Middle East and Asia.
Studies have highlighted the deleterious effects of MD, with correlations between higher levels of MD,
negative perceptions of ethical climate2 and increased levels of compassion fatigue among nurses.3,4
Consensus is that MD can negatively impact patient care, causing nurses to avoid certain clinical situations
and ultimately leave the profession.5,6 MD is therefore a significant problem within nursing, requiring
investigation, understanding, clarification and responses. The growing body of MD research, however, is
arguably failing to bring the required clarification but rather has complicated attempts to study it.7 The
increasing number of cited causes and effects of MD means the term has expanded to the point that
according to Hanna8 and McCarthy and Deady,9 it is becoming an ‘umbrella term’ that lacks conceptual
clarity referring unhelpfully to a wide range of phenomena and causes. Without, however, a coherent and
consistent conceptual understanding, empirical studies of MD’s prevalence, effects, and possible responses
are likely to be confused and contradictory.
A useful starting point is a systematic exploration of existing literature to critically examine definitions
and understandings currently available, interrogating their similarities, differences, conceptual strengths
and weaknesses. This article presents a narrative synthesis that explored proposed necessary and sufficient
conditions for MD, and in doing so, this article also identifies areas of conceptual tension and agreement.
The language of necessary and sufficient conditions is commonly used in philosophy to define and
explain connections between concepts and causality; offering a helpful way to conceptually examine MD.
Mackie10 used the example of a house fire to explain the relationship between necessary and sufficient
conditions, pointing out that there is no single necessary and sufficient condition for a house fire, but there
are some necessary conditions for a fire to occur (such as heat, oxygen, combustible material) and there are
various groups of conditions that are sufficient together but not necessary (a match, for example, can cause a
fire, but so too can a lighter). Importantly, there cannot be a house fire unless these necessary and sufficient
conditions (sources of ignition, combustible material, oxygen) are met.
To use a different illustration, there are certain conditions, such as frailty, immobility or poor nutrition,
associated with the increased likelihood of developing a pressure ulcer. None of these, however, are
necessary or sufficient conditions for a pressure ulcer; they are only factors that increase the likelihood
of an ulcer forming when the necessary and sufficient conditions are met. There is one condition that is both
necessary and sufficient for a pressure ulcer, and that is the presence of continued pressure on the skin. It is
necessary because a pressure ulcer cannot occur without it, and it is sufficient because that is the only thing
needed to form a pressure ulcer. One of the main challenges of defining MD is that, as we shall see, MD
tends to be conceptualized in terms of the conditions in which it arises, for example, ‘MD occurs when
conditions X and Y are met’. This is the starting point of our inquiry, with Jameton’s1 definition being
framed in terms of the conditions in which MD arises. For Jameton, MD occurred when (1) a moral
judgement has been made and (2) there are institutional constraints that prevent that moral judgement from
being acted on. On this account, the presence of ‘constrained moral judgement’ is both a necessary and
sufficient condition of MD. It is necessary because MD cannot occur without it, and it is sufficient because
nothing else is needed for MD to occur. Literature on MD since then has either
1. Accepted this account of MD, as based on a single necessary and sufficient condition and defined in
terms of that condition.
2. Challenged the necessity and/or sufficiency of that single condition.
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3. Suggested adding other necessary or sufficient conditions.
4. Added to the necessary and sufficient conditions a range of specific causes of those conditions.
Definitions of MD are, therefore, a relatively confused and complex bundle of necessary and sufficient
conditions, causes and effects, which the review reported in this article aims to unpick.
Aims
The narrative synthesis aimed to identify key proposed definitions of MD and explore what components of
those definitions, if any, ought to be considered necessary and/or sufficient conditions for MD.
Methods
There are numerous kinds of systematic review, and our approach allows us to capture the rich and
sometimes controversial conceptual development of MD in a way that is not overly reductive.11 Strech
et al.12 suggest a seven-step systematic review process that is sensitive to the challenges of examining
bioethical concepts such as MD. Combined with ‘narrative synthesis’, it provided the flexibility to system-
atically search the literature and synthesize key findings from a range of studies with different aims and
using different methodologies. We used guidelines from Popay et al.13 to direct critical appraisal, data
extraction and explore relationships between studies.
1. Defining the review question
The review question asked, simply, ‘how is MD defined or conceptualized?’ The search was not limited to
one specific discipline because MD is not limited to healthcare or nursing. Table 1 provides details of the
search strategy used for each discipline.
2. Selection of the relevant databases
Databases were searched according to the specific area under exploration. The following databases were
searched: Ovid MEDLINE® In-Process & Other Non-Indexed Citations 1946–Present; PsycINFO®
1967–Present; CINAHL® Plus 1937–Present; EMBASE 1974–24 February 2016; British Nursing Index
Table 1. Search strategy.
tecaF)eussi(1tecaF  2 (participants) 
Moral Distress (MeSH) 
OR 
Moral Distress 
Nurse (MeSH) OR Nurse OR Nurs$ OR Nurs$ 
Moral Distress (MeSH) 
OR 
Moral Distress 
Doctor (MeSH) OR, Physician (MeSH) OR Doctor$ OR Physician$ OR
Medic$ OR Medical Practitioner$ OR MD OR Specialist 
Moral Distress (MeSH) 
OR 
Moral Distress 
Social Worker (MeSH) OR Social Work$ OR, Social Care OR Social 
Work (MeSH) OR
Social Services (MeSH) OR Social Servic$ OR Social Welfare 
Moral Distress (MeSH) 
OR 
Moral Distress 
Education (MeSH) OR Learning (MeSH) OR Learning, OR, School$ OR
Schools (MeSH) OR Academ$ OR Universit$ OR Academies and 
Institutes (MeSH) OR Teach$ OR Teaching (MeSH) 
A 
N 
D 
A 
N 
D 
A 
N 
D 
A 
N 
D 
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1994–Present; Social Care Online and Social Policy and Practice Database (1890–Present); ERIC (EBSCO)
1966–Present; Education Abstracts, cross referenced with EthxWeb (1974–2009) and EUROETHICS.
3. Ancillary search strategies
In addition to electronic searching on relevant databases, hand-searching reference of included studies was
conducted to identify any overlooked papers.
4. Development of search algorithm
Search terms and selection of relevant databases were guided by the discipline in which MD was being
explored (nursing, medicine, social work, education). This process is detailed in the PRISMA diagram in
Figure 1.
5. Relevance assessment of the retrieved references
Relevance assessment was carried out at two stages (Figure 2). First, returned abstracts were reviewed
for eligibility against the inclusion/exclusion criteria (Table 2). In total, 152 papers were selected for
reading in full, data extraction and quality appraisal based on title and abstract review. Second, during
quality appraisal, papers of insufficient quality, or those that did not meet inclusion criteria, were excluded.
6. Data extraction and quality appraisal
Quality assessment was undertaken on all papers that passed the first relevance assessment. Whittemore and
Knafl14 note that quality appraisal in integrative reviews necessarily varies depending on the diversity of the
included data, and as this review incorporated quantitative, qualitative and theoretical papers, this process
was complex. Quality assessment was conducted using a critical appraisal and data extraction guide
(adapted from Popay et al.13) that was adapted for use with both empirical and theoretical papers to inform
thinking about the robustness of each paper. For example, quantitative papers were assessed for validity and
rigour; qualitative papers were assessed for credibility and trustworthiness and theoretical or argument-
based literature was assessed upon the strength, plausibility and transparency of arguments.15
Methodological quality influenced the second relevance assessment so that empirical papers deemed to
be of poor quality were excluded (unless they also undertook theoretical analysis that contributed mean-
ingfully to conceptual development). Conversely, papers judged to be methodologically strong but not
providing conceptual insight were excluded (because they failed to meet inclusion criteria on that basis).
After quality appraisal and relevance assessment (n ¼ 34), papers were retained.
7. Data analysis and data presentation
Following Popay et al.,13 our synthesis involved four steps:
1. Developing a ‘theory of change’: The theory underpinning this review is that there needs to be a
clear understanding of whatMD is in order to avoid confusion and build a rigorous empirical base. In
order to develop this theory, we began by exploring the commonly proposed/used definitions of MD
(see Table 3).
2. Developing a preliminary synthesis of findings from the included studies: Textual descriptions of
studies and tabulation was completed to gather preliminary information on all 152 studies but only
those included in the narrative synthesis will be presented in this article (Table 4, Supplementary
Material). Papers of sufficient methodological rigour and that provide conceptual insight (n ¼ 34)
are discussed and synthesized in the narrative below.
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MORAL DISTRESS IN 
NURSING
(MD1)
MEDINE
351
EMBASE 
371
PsyclINFO
187
CINAHLPlus
388
Britsih nursing 
index
236 
1533
CITATIONS
INCLUSION/EXCLUSION 
CRITERIA APPLIED
1075 excluded after title/abstract 
screen. 323 duplicates across 
databases. 7 articles excluded after 
full text screen. 
128 PAPERS 
SUBJECTED TO 
DATA EXTRACTION
12 INCLUDED FROM HAND-SEARCHING
DATA EXTRACTED FROM 152 PAPERS TOTAL
MORAL DISTRESS IN 
MEDICINE  
(MD 2)
MEDINE
192
EMBASE 
354
PsyclINFO
76
CINAHLPlus
45
667
CITATIONS
INCLUSION/EXCLUSION 
CRITERIA APPLIED
476 excluded after title/abstract 
screen. 181 duplicates across 
databases. 3 articles excluded after 
full text screen. 
7 PAPERS 
SUBJECTED TO
DATA EXTRACTION
MORAL DISTRESS 
IN SOCIAL WORK 
(MD3)
MEDINE
5
Social Care 
Online
1752
Social Policy 
and Practice
5
1762
CITATIONS
INCLUSION/EXCLUSION 
CRITERIA APPLIED
1758 excluded after title/abstract screen. 
1 articles excluded after full text screen. 
3 PAPERS SUBJECTED 
TO DATA EXTRACTION
MORAL DISTRESS 
IN EDUCATION 
(MD4)
MEDINE
116
ERIC
10
Education
abstracts 
13
PsyclINFO
70
209
CITATIONS
INCLUSION/EXCLUSION 
CRITERIA APPLIED
207 excluded after title/abstract 
screen.
2 PAPERS 
SUBJECTED TO 
DATA EXTRACTION
34 PAPERS INCLUDED IN THE NARRATIVE SYNTHESIS 
(7 QUALITATIVE, 7 QUANTITATIVE, 20 THEORETICAL) 
Figure 1. PRISMA table of search results.
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3. Exploring relationships within and between studies: Many of the studies explored causation or
prevalence and because the aim was to gain a greater understanding of the phenomenon itself,
charting of this specific data was deemed unnecessary. Conceptual relationships between studies
were explored and tabulated.
4. Assessing the robustness of the synthesis: Assessing papers for conceptual development from
diverse methodologies requires greater interpretation regarding relevance and consequently this
step can be most susceptible to bias.12 In order to enhance trustworthiness, we have reported this
process in a transparent manner.
We did not follow these seven steps in a linear fashion but used an iterative process, moving between
each stage in the direction that made sense of the data.13
Findings
From the 34 included papers, 20 key definitions were identified (Table 3). Rather than discuss each
definition in depth, our focus is on exploring the necessary/sufficient conditions that make up each defi-
nition, and we discuss these thematically.
Searches conducted
First relevance assessment: papers assessed for 
relevance against inclusion/exclusion criteria shown in 
Table 2
Relevant papers subject to data extraction and quality 
assessment 
Second relevance assessment: papers of sufficient 
methodological strength and/or add to conceptual 
development included within the narrative synthesis
Narrative synthesis undertaken
Figure 2. Flow diagram detailing the inclusion and exclusion process.
Table 2. Inclusion and exclusion criteria for initial review.
Inclusion criteria Exclusion criteria
 Explores moral distress empirically.
 Explores moral distress conceptually or
theoretically.
 Able to access an English language version.
 Does not explore moral distress empirically.
 Does not explore moral distress conceptually.
 Moral distress is only mentioned in the discussion section.
 Editorials, letters or commentaries discussing moral distress.
 Intervention studies.
 Unable to access an English language version.
 Unpublished doctoral theses or dissertations.
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Table 3. Common definitions of moral distress (chronological order).
No. Reference Definition
Necessary and/or
sufficient conditions
1. Jameton1 ‘Moral distress arises when one knows the right thing to
do, but institutional constraints make it nearly
impossible to pursue the right course of action’.
 Having made a moral
judgement
 Institutional constraint
 Desired outcome may or
may not be achieved
2. Wilkinson5 ‘Moral distress is defined by the author as the
psychological disequilibrium & negative feeling state
experienced when a person makes a moral decision
but does not follow through by performing the
moral behavior indicated by that decision’
 Psychological effects
 Havingmade amoral decision
 Constraint on action
 Desired outcome not
achieved
3. Jameton16 ‘ . . . a nurse experiences moral distress when the
nurse makes a moral judgment about a case in which
he or she is involved and the institution or co-
workers make it difficult or impossible for the nurse
to act on that judgment’
 Having made a moral
judgement
 Institutional or coworker
constraint
 Desired outcome may or
may not be achieved
4. Corley17 ‘Jameton defined moral distress as painful feelings and/
or psychological disequilibrium caused by a situation
in which (1) one believes one knows the ethically
ideal action to take and (2) that one cannot carry
out that action because of (3) institutionalized
obstacles such as lack of time, lack of supervisory
support, medical power, institutional policy, or legal
limits’.
 Psychological effects
 Having formed a moral belief
 Desired outcome not
achieved
 Institutional constraint
5. Corley et al.18
(p. 250)
‘Jameton1 defines as moral distress: the painful
psychological disequilibrium that results from
recognizing the ethically appropriate action, yet not
taking it, because of such obstacles as lack of time,
supervisory reluctance, an inhibiting medical power
structure, institution policy, or legal considerations’.
 Psychological effects
 Having formed a moral belief
 Desired outcome not
achieved
 Institutional constraint
6. Corley47 (p. 643) ‘Moral distress is the psychological disequilibrium,
negative feeling state, and suffering experienced
when nurses make a moral decision and then either
do not or feel that they cannot follow through with
the chosen action because of institutional
constraints’.
 Psychological effects
 Having made a moral
judgement
 Desired outcome not
achieved
 Institutional constraints
7. Hanna8 ‘An ‘umbrella category’ that could include the
experience of anguish or suffering associated with
facing a moral dilemma, moral uncertainty as well as
certainty accompanied by constraint’.
 Overarching term
 Psychological effects
 Similar to a moral dilemma,
moral uncertainty and moral
certainty
 Constraint
8. Ka¨lvemark et al.19 ‘Traditional negative stress symptoms that occur due
to situations that involve ethical dimensions and
where the health care provider feels she/he is not
able to preserve all interests and values at stake’.
 Psychological effects
 An ethical problem
 Compromised values
(continued)
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Table 3. (continued)
No. Reference Definition
Necessary and/or
sufficient conditions
9. Peter and
Liaschenko20
‘if moral agency is defined as the capacity to
recognize, deliberate/reflect on, and act on moral
responsibilities, in order to experience moral
distress, an agent is required to possess at least
some autonomy in recognizing and reflecting upon
moral concerns. Yet on the other hand, an agent’s
autonomy must be at least somewhat constrained
in acting upon the very moral responsibilities
he/she understands him/herself to have. This
apparently irresolvable contradiction is moral
distress’.
 Moral agency/moral
autonomy
 Constraint on moral agency/
moral autonomy
10. Corley et al.21 ‘Jameton,1 who defined it as painful feelings and/or the
psychological disequilibrium that occurs when
nurses are conscious of the morally appropriate
action a situation requires but cannot carry out that
action because of institutionalized obstacles’.
 Psychological effects
 Being aware of a moral belief
 Desired outcome not
achieved
 Institutional constraints
11. American Association
of Critical Care
Nurses42 (p. 1)
‘Moral distress occurs when:
You know the ethically appropriate action to take,
but are unable to act upon it.
You act in a manner contrary to your personal and
professional values, which undermines your
integrity and authenticity’.
 Having made a moral
judgement
 Constraint
 Moral integrity
compromised
12. Nathaniel48 (p. 421) ‘Moral distress is pain affecting the mind, the body, or
relationships that results from a patient care
situation in which the nurse is aware of a moral
problem, acknowledges moral responsibility, and
makes a moral judgment about the correct action,
yet, as a result of real or perceived constraints,
participates, either by act or omission, in a manner
he or she perceives to be wrong’.
 Psychological effects
 Physical effects
 Aware of a moral problem
 Acknowledges moral
responsibility
 Makes a moral judgement
 Constraint or perceived
constraint
 Desired outcome is not
achieved
13. Canadian Nurses
Association49
(p. 6)
‘Ethical (or moral) distress arises in situations where
nurses know or believe they know the right thing to
do, but for various reasons (including fear or
circumstances beyond their control) do not or
cannot take the right action or prevent a particular
harm. When values and commitments are
compromised in this way, nurses’ identity and
integrity as moral agents are affected as they feel
moral distress’.
 Having formed a moral
judgement or a moral belief
 Constraints
 Values compromised
 Commitments
compromised
 Moral identity compromised
(continued)
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Table 3. (continued)
No. Reference Definition
Necessary and/or
sufficient conditions
14. McCarthy and Deady9 ‘ . . . an umbrella concept that captures the range of
experiences of individual who are morally
constrained. Generally speaking, when individuals
make moral judgments about the right course of
action to take in a situation, and they are unable to
carry it out, they may experience moral distress. In
short, they know what is the right thing to do, but
they are unable to do it; or they do what they
believe is the wrong thing’.
 Overarching term
 Constraint
 Having made a moral
judgement
 Desired outcome is not
achieved
15. McCarthy50(p. 1) ‘Moral distress is an umbrella concept that describes
the psychological, emotional and physiological
suffering that may be experienced when we act in
ways that are inconsistent with deeply held ethical
values, principles or moral commitments’.
 Psychological effects
 Physiological suffering
 Compromised ethical
values, principles or moral
commitments
16. Jameton22 ‘Moral distress- a common experience in complex
societies- arises when individuals have clear moral
judgments about societal practices, but have
difficulty in finding a venue in which to express
concerns’.
 Having made a moral
judgement
 Affects society as a whole
 Unable to express concerns
 Desired outcome not
achieved
17. Hamric and Wocial,
personal
communication,
October 24, 2013
in Hamric43
‘Moral distress occurs when an individual’s moral
integrity is seriously compromised, either because
one feels unable to act in accordance with core
values and obligations, or attempted actions fail to
achieve the desired outcome’.
 Moral integrity
compromised
 Desired outcome not
achieved, despite efforts.
18. Barlem and Ramos.24 ‘ . . . the feeling of powerlessness experienced during
power games in the micro-spaces of action, which
lead the subject to a chain of events that impels him
or her to accept imposed individualities, have his or
her resistances reduced and few possibilities of
moral action; this obstructs the process of moral
deliberation, compromises advocacy and moral
sensitivity, which results in ethical, political and
advocational inexpressivity and a series of physical,
psychical and behavioural manifestations’.
 Constraint on moral action
 Constraint on moral
deliberation
 Constraint on one’s ability
to advocate
 Reduction of moral
sensitivity
 Feelings of powerlessness
 Physical, psychological and
behavioural effects
19. Fourie25 ‘Moral distress is a psychological response to morally
challenging situations such as those of moral
constraint or moral conflict, or both’.
 Psychological effects
 Morally challenging situation
20. Campbell et al.26 ‘One or more negative self-directed emotions or
attitudes that arise in response to one’s perceived
involvement in a situation that one perceives to be
morally undesirable’.
 Self-directed psychological
effects
 Morally undesirable
situation
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Moral judgements
Jameton’s1 definition stipulates moral judgement and constraint as necessary and sufficient conditions for
MD and differentiates MD from ‘moral dilemmas’ and ‘moral uncertainty’. According to Jameton,16 the
nurses he encountered were describing as ‘dilemmas’ instances where they hadmade amoral judgement but
were unable to act upon it, and this is what caused their MD. Similarly, Peter et al.27 found that although
uncertainty pervaded nurses’ narratives of aggressive care, they only experienced what they called MD, in
situations where they ‘knew’ the right thing but were constrained. The subsequent narrative surrounding
MD focused on the complexities of negotiating their moral judgements in the presence of constraints.27 To
make sense of this definition, we must be clear about what it is to have made a moral judgement and to be
constrained. There is little ambiguity about how to understand ‘constraint’ – it is a barrier to acting as one
would want. There is, however, ambiguity about what a ‘moral judgement’ is. Terminology in the literature
ranges from a ‘moral judgement’, ‘moral decision’, ‘moral belief’ or an ‘awareness’ (see definitions 1, 2, 3,
5, 6, and 11 in Table 3). Considering these terms can mean different things, when used interchangeably we
are faced with the problem of whether they are being used, perhaps erroneously, as a synonym for ‘moral
judgement’ understood consistently, or if a different meaning is intended.Whether we can, therefore, accept
‘moral judgement’ as a necessary condition of MD will depend on what we mean when we say ‘moral
judgement’.
Fourie25 critiqued Jameton’s1,16 definitions of MD on the basis that they are unacceptably narrow. If
moral judgement is a necessary condition of MD, then it cannot occur in situations characterized by
indecision, such as moral dilemmas or uncertainty. On this basis, many definitions in Table 3 could be
critiqued as too narrow (with a few exceptions, namely, Ka¨lvermark et al.,19 Fourie25 and Campbell et al.26).
Fourie’s criticism is that while moral judgement might be a sufficient condition for MD (when combined
with constraint), it ought not be thought necessary becauseMD can be experienced in the absence of a moral
judgement, for example, when one is faced with a moral dilemma and feels uncertain about what judgement
should be made.
The psychological and physical effects of MD
Jameton’s1 definition can also be viewed as too narrow due to the exclusive focus on causal conditions. On
his account, there is no necessary affective component to MD, andMD could occur without anyone actually
feeling distressed, as all that is needed is a moral judgement that cannot be acted upon.Wemight reasonably
assume that the feeling of distress is implicit on Jameton’s definition, but Wilkinson5 was the first to
explicitly incorporate the psychological effects of MD into a definition. After carrying out interviews with
24 nurses, Wilkinson5 described seven ‘indicators’ that were perceived to contribute to, or were influenced
by, MD. Wilkinson5 concluded that MD produced feelings of anger, frustration and guilt, which were
produced in response to one’s moral decision being thwarted. Wilkinson28 argued that Jameton’s definition
failed to refer to the effects (psychological distress) of MD and only indicated the cause (judgement þ
constraint) and so incorporated both cause and effect into her definition of MD (Table 3, definition 2). Since
Wilkinson, it seems to be taken for granted that MD has both a causal and affective component, requiring a
particular cause and particular response.
What that response is, and whether any are necessary and/or sufficient, is unclear. The qualitative
literature captures a broad range of likely psychological and physical effects of MD. In Wiegand and
Funk,29 nurses discussed feeling frustration, anger, sadness, psychological/physical exhaustion, helpless-
ness, distress and depression. While Hanna8 described the physical effects of MD as sleeplessness, nausea,
migraines, gastrointestinal upset, tearfulness and physical exhaustion.
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Moral dilemmas and uncertainty
Fourie25 argued that Jameton16 used the terms ‘moral dilemma’ and ‘moral conflict’ interchangeably,
implying a commonsense understanding of ‘moral dilemma’, and that being where we are faced with a
difficult moral decision but, with enough thought, it is possible to identify the morally correct action.
Conversely, the standard philosophical view of moral dilemmas is that a dilemma occurs where there are
two competing and equally strong obligations that cannot both be met.25 This leads to a further narrowing of
Jameton’s definition, as it suggests that no instances of uncertainty (whether a moral conflict or a genuine
dilemma) can be a sufficient condition of MD.
Some empirical researchers, such as Ka¨lvemark et al.,19 found that distress occurred during moral
dilemmas and uncertainty, when healthcare professionals (HCPs) were uncertain about the right
course of action, and called this MD. This resulted in a definition (definition 8, Table 3) of MD
that disassociated MD from moral judgement and turned it into a negative psychological response to a
perceived inability to act in the moral interests of all stakeholders and uncertainty about whose
interests ought to be prioritized. This account adds moral uncertainty and experiencing dilemma as
a sufficient condition for MD, but does not rule out constraint. Inability to act in all stakeholders’
moral interests could flow from both failing to make a decision (uncertainty, genuine dilemma) and
from the inability to act (constraint).
More recently, Campbell et al.26 argued that six causes of MD (moral uncertainty, mild distress, delayed
distress, moral dilemma, bad moral luck and distress by association) fell outside Jameton’s1 definition and
argued this should motivate a broader understanding of MD that could accommodate all of these causes as
sufficient (definition 20, Table 3).
These responses to Jameton1 are examples of typical responses that challenge the idea of moral judge-
ment and/or constraint being a necessary condition of MD and seek instead to place it as one of the many
causal conditions that may be sufficient when combined with others. Some 30 years after publishing his
original definition, Jameton,22 however, appears to have gone further, rejecting moral judgement as even a
sufficient condition and making moral uncertainty a necessary condition. In Jameton’s22 words:
. . . [m]oral distress expresses a decision point, a moment of emotive immobility, where ambivalence needs to be
resolved toward a choice. Once the choice is made and action is undertaken, the psychological elements of
distress tend to diminish.
Here, Jameton22 implies that MD occurs exactly when one is forced to choose between two similarly
weighted actions (a moral dilemma or difficult decision), where different obligations conflict and the
correct course of action is uncertain. Psychological distress follows from the inability to decide, receding
once a decision is made.
Jameton22 still appears to imply that there is a correct course of action and once it has been identified, the
decision-maker will no longer feel distressed. Against this, Weinberg30 argues that MD can occur when
there is no ‘correct’ course of action identified. It seems just as plausible that MD could follow from an
unsatisfactory decision as from uncertainty and inaction.
Constraints as causes of MD
Jameton’s1 definition framed MD as a purely occupational issue, arising because of institutional barriers or
constraints.8,31 This resulted in decades of research that assumed constraint to be a necessary condition of
MD, exploring the nature and kind of constraints that caused MD, and using the presence of constraint, and
responses to it, as a way of measuring MD and its prevalence.
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The Moral Distress Scale
Corley17 developed the first Moral Distress Scale (MDS), underpinned by definition 4 (Table 3), and a
revised scale in 2005, underpinned by definition 10 (Table 3). The MDS lists possible scenarios where a
nurse is constrained from carrying out their preferred moral action, asking respondents to score the fre-
quency and intensity of MD. The MDS was further revised by Hamric et al.32 who developed the Moral
Distress Scale–Revised (MDS-R). These scales have been frequently modified by individual researchers
from different countries who have, arguably, equivocated conceptions of MD while using an instrument
constructed using a specific conception of MD, giving us reason to doubt the internal consistency of their
studies. For example, Browning33 used and modified the MDS, a measure of constraint, and yet stated that
MD occurred during moral dilemmas, defining MD as ‘discomfort or internal conflict related to ethical
dilemmas encountered in nursing practice when constraints prevented the nurse from following the course
of action believed to be right’. Hamric7 highlights how ‘valid measures require a tight linkage between the
concept and the items developed for the measure. It is clear that, at present, multiple measures exist which
measure different concepts’. This not only raises questions about internal consistency but it also creates
difficulties when conducting meta-analysis; even when studies purportedly use the same measure, they
seem to be discussing different concepts and so cannot be readily compared.
Ethical climate
Further examination of constraint on action led to researchers exploring the relationship between constraint
on actions and the ethical climate of institutions. Again, Corley et al.21 led the way with quantitative
exploration using a revised MDS and an Ethical Environment Questionnaire (EEQ).34 Subsequently, others
have found positive perceptions of ethical climate to be associated with lower MD scores.6,32,35,36 Eviden-
cing links between MD and institutional ethical climate is useful for developing ways to reduce MD. Musto
and Rodney37 argue, however, that they are overly simplistic, mapping correlations only, and do not
illuminate the complex interplay between an individual’s moral agency, the institution’s interests and
resulting MD.
Possibly, with this kind of critique in mind, Peter and Liaschenko20 suggest reframing MD in terms of
having moral agency that one is unable to act on, thereby being unable to fulfil one’s perceived moral
responsibilities (definition 9, Table 3). Adopting a feminist ethical framework, Peter and Liaschenko38
explore the personal or perceived constraints that cause MD. They suggest that MD is a response to
constraints on nurses’ moral identities, responsibilities and relationships rather than a response to specific
external causes. They emphasize the social connectedness of ethics and the belief that moral knowledge is
born out of shared moral experiences. They argue that institutions often create constraints on nurses’ moral
identities (rather than on discrete actions), restricting their ability to act as autonomous moral agents and so
preventing them from acting in accordance with their core values and professional responsibilities. For
these authors, the violation of one’s moral agency, rather than constraint on action, is the necessary and
sufficient condition for MD. Constraint on action may cause this violation, but it is not the only possible
cause. If this is the case, then qualitative rather than quantitative methods may be more suitable to gather the
rich data required to explore violations of moral identity and moral agency.
Internal constraints
Epstein and Hamric39 suggest that MD can also be caused by internal constraints on one’s moral actions.
Internal or personal constraints are regarded as self-doubt, lack of assertiveness, socialization to follow
orders, perceived powerlessness and lack of understanding. Internal constraints have received very little
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attention within the quantitative literature, with limited qualitative exploration. It is likely that this lack of
exploration is due to MD being predominantly conceptualized as arising from external constraint on action.
Barlem and Ramos24 theorize that it is the power play in various ‘micro-spaces’ which can create internal
constraints which impede one’s ability to deliberate about moral issues.
Epistemic injustice
One suggested form of constraint on the moral agency of nurses identified by Reed and Rishel40 is epistemic
injustice. They argue that MD occurs because often nurses aren’t informed of treatment decisions and their
views often not incorporated into decision-making or interdisciplinary discussions, creating ‘epistemic
inequality’ in the workplace. Insofar as nurses (1) have to convey and enact decisions made by others,
(2) are in a position of epistemic uncertainty and (3) have not been a part of the process, they are acting as
mouthpieces for others rather than as autonomous moral agents. Reed and Rishel argue that this is an
epistemic injustice, ‘a wrong done to someone specifically in their capacity as a knower’. This is based upon
the work of Fricker,41 who argues there are two kinds of epistemic injustice: testimonial and hermeneutical.
In testimonial injustice, the speaker is discredited because of the listener’s prejudice. This can occur in
nurse–physician interactions in the context of end-of-life decisions, where nurses’ are undermined in their
capacity as knowers, experience epistemic injustice and, consequently, MD.40 Hermeneutical injustice
occurs when a nurse’s professional opinion is undermined and ignored. Reed and Rishel40 argue this is
an example of discrimination against one’s social identity; nurses are below doctors in the medical hier-
archy. They argue that ‘this hinders development of intellectual courage, selfhood, and well-being, as well
as impoverishes disciplinary knowledge overall’.40 Arguably, on this account, the MD an agent experiences
as a result of either kind of epistemic injustice flows from the agent being wronged by a failure to respect her
as a moral agent. This conception of MD is also supported by Peter el al.27 who provide quotes from nurses
who have experienced both forms of epistemic injustice. It is not clear, however, to what extent epistemic
injustice could be considered a necessary condition of MD or whether it is simply another example of a way
in which one’s moral agency can be constrained.
Threat to moral integrity
In 2006, the American Association of Critical Care Nurses (AACN)42 released a position statement claim-
ing that the inability to act upon personal and professional values undermines integrity and authenticity, and
this is core to the experience of MD (definition 11, Table 3). This distinction between professional and
personal values does not feature in previously suggested definitions of MD, despite some discussion in the
literature.8,23
Although integrity has not received the same attention as constraint, it has not been entirely ignored.
Recently, Hamric43 and Wocial also suggested that integrity is central to MD (definition 17, Table 3) and
that compromised moral integrity causes an emotional distress response, such as avoidance, frustration and
anger. Thomas and McCullough44 also developed an account that draws on moral integrity, arguing that
MD could be divided into six philosophical categories: challenges to, threats to, and violations of profes-
sional integrity; and challenges to, threats to, and violations of personal integrity. They argued that these
categories place different values under threat and thereby cause different degrees ofMD. These accounts are
consistent with Wilkinson’s5 cause and effect model, and frame MD in terms of necessary cause (threat to
moral integrity) and necessary effect (psychological distress). Arguably, however, the use of moral integrity
does not bring any clarification, as it is itself an ambiguous concept, that may include all the sufficient
causes hereto discussed.
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Thomas and McCullough44 used Beauchamp and Childress45 definition of moral integrity, characteriz-
ing it as ‘soundness, reliability, wholeness, and integration of moral character’, and ‘objectivity, imparti-
ality, and fidelity in adherence to moral norms’. Hardingham,46 for whom moral integrity is a necessary
condition of MD, adopted an interpretation from the political philosopher Larry May, where moral integrity
refers to ‘a wholeness in the relationship between our actions and our values and beliefs . . . about a certain
conception of our self as being a consistent whole’. Like MD, moral integrity can be understood in a variety
of ways and is contested. As such, introducing the concept of moral integrity in order to bring about
conceptual clarification of MD does not work – it merely defers the problem.
Discussion
The review has highlighted, and unpicked, the many different conceptual foundations of MD in the
literature. ‘Narrow’ conceptions of MD sprung from Jameton’s1,16 definition which considered both moral
judgement and constraint necessary and sufficient conditions of MD. One of the main difficulties with
Jameton’s original account was the condition of ‘moral judgement’ being ambiguous, leading to different
understandings of MD. Across a range of accounts that purported to be consistent with Jameton, ‘moral
judgement’ seems to be used inconsistently, referring (in different accounts) to apparently different cog-
nitive states of varying epistemic strength. For example, to have a belief ‘that x’ seems to be saying
something quite different, and stronger, to having an ‘awareness of x’; and yet, all these cognitive states,
collectively referred to as ‘moral judgement’, are seen as equivocal to the basic state of an agent having
made a decision regarding the right thing to do. This might be argued to be simply an inconsequential
difference of expression rather than meaning, but it is problematic because consistent and unambiguous
language is vital when trying to understand a complex concept. Furthermore, in the context of moral
philosophy, the difference between labelling something as a belief, a judgement or an awareness can be
significant and would alter the conditions for MD. On a more practical level, questionnaires designed to
measure MD are reliant on participants and researchers having the same understanding of ‘moral judge-
ment’ for their effectiveness. Risk of conceptual conflation and equivocation is high.
Fourie25 also highlighted that Jameton’s16 interchangeable use of the terms ‘moral dilemma’ and ‘moral
conflict’ implied that he adopted a commonsense notion of moral dilemmas, aligning dilemma with moral
conflict. Accepting this interpretation leads to a conception of MD that excludes experiences associated
with internal conflict, dilemma or uncertainty, and this seems to conflict with empirical accounts of MD.
One response may be that people who give these accounts are mistaken about what MD is because they have
not met the necessary and sufficient conditions of judgement and constraint. Alternatively, we could accept
those accounts and expand Jameton’s narrow definition to accommodate them. This requires us to explain
MD in terms of a distress response to a range of possible causes, including moral conflict and uncertainty.
The idea of constraint as a sufficient condition for MD has been consistently used and the notion that it is
a necessary condition has been perpetuated, in part, through the use of quantitative measures ofMD, such as
the MDS andMDS-R. These presuppose constraint as the cause of MD and therefore only measure MD as a
phenomenon arising from constraint. The use of a scale both ‘pre-codes’ and interprets given situations as
causing MD and therefore primes the participant to accept this account of MD as a ‘reality’.18
These problems with narrow conceptions of MD led to broader definitions, which initially included the
psychological (and physical) effects.5 However, Fourie25 has argued that stipulating both specific cause
(constraint) and effect (psychological effects) simply creates a ‘compound’ definition that is also too narrow
and overlooks other causal conditions of MD, such as moral conflicts, dilemmas or uncertainty. This
criticism, however, appears to be about the exclusive nature of Jameton’s account (limited as it is to just
one cause), rather than its compound nature, and could be dealt with by extending the range of causes, which
is what most subsequent accounts of MD have tried to do.
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The psychological distress component of MD, however, seems to have become a necessary condition of
MD. Indeed, if we appeal to a commonsense understanding of the term ‘moral distress’, it seems obvious
that any distress causally associated with a ‘moral event’, such as a moral dilemma or moral uncertainty is,
ipso facto, MD. Although commonsensical, it does not necessarily clarify anything, and the problem
remains of defining what a ‘moral event’ is and of determining what the causal association between the
‘moral event’ and the distress looks like.
Arguably, psychological distress is a necessary condition of MD but not a sufficient one. A person may
experience psychological distress linked to life events but to be properly labelled MD, it seems necessary
that the distress is directly causally related to a ‘moral event’. This would make the combination of (1) the
experience of a moral event, (2) the experience of ‘psychological distress’ and (3) a direct causal relation
between (1) and (2) necessary and sufficient conditions for MD.
Conclusion
Research suggests that MD negatively affects nurses. In order to support nurses through their experiences of
MD, we need to understand both the phenomenon and the context in which it occurs. We have shown that
there is still little agreement about the conditions that causeMD and therefore there is doubt about what MD
is and when and how it occurs. By analysing the key definitions of MD and suggesting which conditions
could be regarded as necessary and/or sufficient, we have, however, contributed to definitional and con-
ceptual clarity that is required for us to increase our understanding of MD and shape our responses to it.
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